James Tomberlin, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 5: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION by Leftow, Brian
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 13 Issue 2 Article 9 
4-1-1996 
Tomberlin, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 5: PHILOSOPHY 
OF RELIGION 
Brian Leftow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Leftow, Brian (1996) "Tomberlin, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 5: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," 
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol13/iss2/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, James Tomberlin, ed. 
Atascadero, Cal.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991. Pp. vii and 646. $22.00. 
BRIAN LEFfOW, Fordham University 
This is a rich, varied, interesting volume, one of the best in a fine series. A 
quick survey of its contents page should whet the appetite of anyone inter-
ested in current philosophy of religion: Tooley and Rowe offer versions of 
the argument from evil, while Alston and Van Inwagen counter that humans 
are not in the right epistemic position to judge such arguments sound. 
Marilyn Adams explores the non-moral aspect of the concept of sin, and 
William Mann the problems moral dilemmas pose for theistic ethical theory 
(introducing en route the intriguing concept of a moral monolemma). 
Chisholm defends the soul's simplicity, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz its intelli-
gibility. Audi, Gale and Quinn tackle religious epistemology. Plantinga dis-
cusses his views of warrant and the prospects for natural theology. Fischer 
treats Ockllamism, Robert M. Adams offers a new argument against middle 
knowledge, and Thomas Flint offers one for it. Stump, Kretzmann and 
Wierenga debate whether the doctrine of divine timelessness can on its own 
reconcile human freedom with the existence of divinely revealed prophecies 
and the past truth of claims about what God timelessly knows. Freddoso 
argues that God must not only conserve creatures' existence but actively 
"concur" with their actions, while McCann and Kvanvig urge that mere con-
servation is enough to entail occasionalism (i.e. that there are no causally effi-
cacious creaturely actions with which to concur). Wolterstorff takes on 
divine simplicity. Menzel gives an account of divine ideas and God's pre-
creative foreknowledge. Earl Conee discusses the claim that God is able to 
do literally anything, possible or not. And Edward Zalta and Paul 
Oppenheimer give a new broadly Meinongian analysis of the ontological 
argument. 
The papers all are of high quality, and the paperback price of $22.00 for 
more than 600 pages of such work fits the book for a philosophical 
Consumer Reports' Best Buy list. This book's sheer size precludes saying 
anything worthwhile about all or even most of the papers. So I will use my 
space to talk about a few that especially interested me. 
1. Hoffman, Rosenkrantz and the soul 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz discuss problems in defining the soul, individ-
uating souls and understanding souls' persistence over time. They also con-
sider questions about the claim that souls can interact with bodies. Their 
claim (184) that souls have no spatial locations raises one such question: if 
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this is hue, how can souls and bodies interact? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 
suggest (198-9) that soul-body interaction seems problematic only if one 
thinks that 
TM. for any x and y, if x produces motion in y, x transfers some of 
x's motion to y. 
If (TM) is hue, an unlocated soul cannot produce motion in a body. For 
an item can transfer motion only if it is moving, and so only if it has a spatial 
location (198). Hoffman and Rosenkrantz try to undermine (TM)'s support, 
and suggest that even if souls cannot transfer motion to bodies, there may 
just be fundamental laws correlating soul-events with some physical 
motions (199). Such laws, they claim, would not violate but just supersede 
or overrule basic physical laws (200-1). 
I am not sure this reply exhausts the problem. If body and soul interact, 
body affects soul. One need not endorse (TM) to think that bodies act only 
by sending physical signals or exerting physical energy. But a physical sig-
nal can only arrive at some place in space. Again, if physical energy reached 
an unlocated soul, it would disappear from physical space. This would vio-
late the conservation laws unless for each such event, some non-physical 
cause simultaneously added an equal amount of energy to the universe. 
One would prefer a mind/body theory which did not require God or the 
soul constantly to scramble to keep the universe's books balanced. Again, if 
an unlocated soul produces motion in a body, it causes the body to have a 
certain amount of kinetic energy. As the soul causes this, the energy has no 
physical source: it is physically ex nihilo. If the soul does not transfer this 
energy to the body, the soul brings it into existence without transferring it 
from any source. This might preserve the letter of the conservation law 
(without its spirit), or might "supersede" it. But given Einstein's equivalence 
equation, it is equivalent to bringing a certain amount of mass into existence 
physically ex nihilo. Atheists might doubt that this is possible. Theists might 
justly protest that this is God's specialty, and He does not share it. 
2. Menzel on divine ideas 
Menzel defends the claim that before creating any individuals, God had 
only purely general ideas of the creatures He was to make. There was no 
merely possible Menzel for Him to actualize (479). There was no individual 
essence (haecceity) of Menzel, such that God could act to create Menzel by 
acting to instance that property (488-93). There was just a purely general 
possibility of some individual qualitatively just like Menzel. Thus according 
to Menzel, 
before God's creation, it was outside of God's control to bring it 
about that I exist... there was, by the generality of the possible, sim-
ply no action that could guarantee that I, rather than someone else 
just like me, would exist (500). 
God acted to create some Menzelish man or other, and Menzel was who He 
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got. Menzel's exposition of his position is lapidary, and he makes an inter-
esting case for its theological adequacy (498-502). But one can still raise a 
metaphysical worry. 
If God could have intended to make someone just like Menzel and gotten 
someone other than Menzel, then there is something to Menzel which makes 
him Menzel and not someone else, such that there could have been someone 
else just like Menzel who lacked that something. Thus there is more to being 
Menzel than being an instance of the divine concept Menzel instances, a 
"more" such that a divine concept which does not contain this "more" fails 
to discriminate between Menzel and someone else. But what can this 
"more" be? Menzel rules out haecceities. Menzel thinks that God's idea of 
him contains each of his non-haecceity attributes (497).1 If so, this "more" 
cannot be a non-haecceity attribute. If it cannot, it must be something which 
bears attributes. If this bearer had any intrinsic character, it would intrinsi-
cally bear an attribute. This attribute would then be part of God's idea of 
Menzel and make that an idea of Menzel, not someone else. So this bearer 
must (it seems) be bare of attributes. Menzel's view seems to imply, then, 
that each individual has two constituents, the nature a divine idea captures 
plus a bare particular bearing it. Commitment to bare particulars would be a 
good reason to reject Menzel's position. 
3. Wolterstorff on divine simplicity 
The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), in a nutshell, is that God is not 
composed of parts or other constituents.2 Wolterstorff sets out the surprising 
importance this abstract thesis had in medieval philosophical theology (531), 
then notes a problem DDS raises. The medievals infer from DDS that God's 
nature and properties are not distinct from God (532). Thus for them, DDS 
entails a number of counter-intuitive identity-statements, e.g. (letting "deity" 
denote the divine nature) that 
1. God = deity.J 
(1) is puzzling because it seems to identify a concrete with an abstract entity. 
Wolterstorff claims that a proper appreciation of the medievals' distinc-
tive ontological "style" can dispel the puzzlement (1) generates. Wolterstorff 
suggests that (1) was not problematic for the medievals because they 
thought in terms of "constituent ontology.,,4 We now (says Wolterstorff) 
treat attributes as abstract entities their bearers exemplify. The medievals 
took a thing's nature and other attributes as constituents of a sort: 
The nature of an entity, a medieval would have said, is what-it-is-as-
such. An entity does not have a certain nature in the way it has a 
certain property. It is a certain nature. If an entity is something as 
such, then it is a certain nature ... There is no mystery in how it can 
be ... that God is a certain nature. Everything ... is a certain some-
thing-as-such ... The only mystery about God-if mystery it be-is 
that we do not have to add, "but that's not all God is" ... For a 
medieval, I suggest, an essence or nature was just as concrete as that 
of which it is the nature. That is because everything, including 
every concrete thing, is a something-as-such (541-2). 
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So according to Wolterstorff, in its medieval context, (1) does not identify an 
abstract and concrete entity. Rather, (1) identifies "two" concreta. 
Let me assess this argument by reference to Wolterstorff's sample con-
stituent ontologist, Aquinas. Thomas parses the claim "a human is white" 
(homo est album) as "a human is a thing having whiteness" (homo est... habens 
albedinem), i.e. "a human = a thing having whiteness.s Thus Thomas reads 
predications as "really" identity-statements.6 Thomas takes the statement "a 
human is an animal" as a predication. So he reads this too as an identity-
statement, and infers that 
everything present in a species is present in the genus in a non-
determined way. For if the animal were not the whole which is a 
human, but just a part of a human, "animal" would not be predicat-
ed of a human. For no integral part is predicated of its whole.7 
Taking predication as involving identity, we can paraphrase Thomas 
thus: 
if the animal were not the whole which is a human, but just a part of 
a human, the animal would not be identical with a human. For no 
integral part is identical with its whole. 
But in fact, the same form which makes us animal makes us human: in a 
human, "humanity" and "animality" signify (as part) the same form.8 So 
what instances the one form ipso facto is identical with something instancing 
the other: a human is as such an animal. 
Thomas continues that 
The nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the indi-
vidual just as the nature of the genus with respect to the species. 
This is why just as that which is the genus, as it is predicated of the 
species, says implicitly in its signification, though indistinctly, all 
that which determinately is in the species, so that which is the 
species, as it is predicated of the individual, signifies all that essen-
tially is in the individual (granted, indistinctly). The name "human" 
signifies in this way the essence of the species: whence "human" is 
predicated of Socrates.9 
In other words, though "human" signifies any individual human indistinct-
ly, in "Socrates is human,""human" names the very individual "Socrates" 
names. This is why we can say that Socrates is/is identical with a human. 1i1 
For Aquinas, then, "Socrates is human" does not assert or imply that 
Socrates is a nature. It asserts, as one would think, that Socrates is (identical 
with) a thing bearing a nature. The parallel to this would be not (1) but the 
claim "God = a divine being," which is not problematic. Asserting that 
Socrates is a nature would for Aquinas mean asserting that 
2. Socrates is humanity. 
(2) does parallel (1). But Thomas rejects (2) as identifying a whole with one 
of its constituentsY "Socrates = humanity" is false because Socrates also 
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includes other constituents.12 
Still, let us consider a "constituent" approach to predication generally. On 
such an approach, presumably, "Socrates is human" is true because Socrates 
contains a particular sort of constituent. Socrates' being human is like a 
whole's including a part. Thus a constituent ontologist takes the "is" of 
predication as logically akin to "_has as a part_."p Now when a thing has 
but one part, it contains that part and that part contains it: its relation to that 
part is identity. So on a constituent approach, if God contains no con-
stituents distinct from deity, (1) is true. On a constituent approach, then, 
"God is divine" entails (1) if God is simple. 
We now have an explanation of how it can be that "God is divine" uses 
the same copula "Socrates is hmnan" uses, yet "God is divine" entails (1) but 
"Socrates is human" does not entail (2). But does this remove the scandal 
from (1)? Even for constihlent ontologists, natures are attributes. So (1) still 
identifies God with an attribute. If so, Wolterstorff demystifies (1) only by 
claiming that one sort of attribute is a concrete, not an abstract entity. This 
claim is itself mysterious, given that Wolterstorff does not explain what a 
nature is. Thus (1) remains difficult. 
4. Conee on absolute omnipotence 
Conee argues that there could be a being which is absolutely omnipotent 
(AO), i.e. "has an ability with respect to each proposition to have it be true 
and to have it be false" (449).14 An AO being would be able to make it the 
case that 2+2=5. But it is impossible that 2+2=5. If it is impossible that 
2+2=5, it is impossible that any being make it the case that 2+2=5. So some-
thing AO would be able to do what it is impossible for it to do. It would 
have an ability it calIDot exercise (454-6). 
One naturally supposes that an agent is able to bring it about that P only if 
that agent can use that ability, and so possibly brings it about that P. So 
Conee's claim that there could be something AO (448) denies 
The Having-Exercising Principle (HEP). If it is in some way 
possible (e.g. physically possible, metaphysically possible) to 
have some ability, then it is in the same way possible to exercise 
the ability (460). 
Conee therefore argues against HEP: 
God is able to do things that are physically impossible. (So) God is 
supposed to have an ability that is not exercised in any physically 
possible situation. This seems at least to be possible. Yet HEP 
denies it. So much the worse for HEP. Without HEP, there is no 
good reason to deny the more extreme claim that it is possible to 
have an ability to do the impossible (461). 
But this argument seems questionable. Perhaps Conee thinks theists 
believe that 
3. God is able to do things that are physically impossible. Because they 
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allow that God can do miracles. But one can parse (3) as 
4. God is able to bring about states of affairs incompatible with physical 
laws, or 
5. God is able to bring about states of affairs no purely physical agent can 
naturally bring about.]S 
It is not clear that theists who allow the possibility of miracles commit them-
selves to (4). In possible-worlds terms, (4) asserts that 
4*. God is able to bring about states of affairs which obtain in no 
possible world with the physical laws of our world. 
If God does a miracle, He brings about states of affairs in a possible world 
with the physical laws of our world- namely our world. So it is conceivable 
that God do miracles even if (4*) is false; belief in miracles would not commit 
a theist to (4*), or to a belief that God has an ability He does not exercise in 
any physically possible situation. If God brings about a state of affairs S in a 
world with laws L, either Sand L are compatible or they are not. If they are 
not, God brings about a contradiction by bringing about S. Theists who 
affirm miracles do not mean to affirm that God brings about contradictions. 
They affirm rather that the physical laws of our world are not quite what we 
thought they were, since the laws allow these unusual events. 
(5) better explicates what theists think about miracles. Physical agents 
have certain natures and natural powers. This is what accounts for ordinary 
physical regularities. But God can nonetheless miraculously achieve what 
no physical agent can naturally achieve by acting without physical interme-
diary or by granting physical agents temporary trans-natural powers. Either 
is compatible with physical agents' not being able to do naturally what mirac-
ulously occurs. But again, if God does either, God acts in a physically possi-
ble world. For physically possible worlds are those in which physical beings 
have just the natures and natural powers they do have. Physical beings have 
these even if God does miracles. So (5) does not license the claim that God 
has an ability He uses in no physically possible situation. 
Still, (4*) can seem true. For it can seem true that 
6. in our possible world, God is able to actualize worlds with other physi-
cal laws than ours. 
If God has this ability, He exercises it in no physically possible world. But is 
(6) true? Before actualizing our world, God certainly could have actualized a 
world with different laws.]6 Again, God can alter the laws of our universe, 
bringing it about that there is a universe whose laws differ from those we 
now have, e.g. by creating a new kind of creature with natural powers 
beyond those now extant. But God can exercise this ability in a physically 
possible world. If it is not now physically possible (compatible with the 
natures of existing physical things) that purely natural powers effect it that P, 
this does not entail that it is not now physically possible that this be physical-
ly possible. A change of natural law may itself be physically possible. 
Again, God can now annihilate our universe and then replace it with one 
whose laws are different. But this may not entail that (6) is true. To annihi-
late a universe is not to "de-actualize': a possible world Suppose that in (6) 
"is able" means "is fully able," i.e. "can now do as His next action, needing 
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to do nothing else to enable Himself." If our world and its laws L are actual, 
God is now fully able to make a --, L world only if He is fully able to make L 
and --, L at once the laws of an actual world. That is, if (6) states something 
God is now fully able to do, God is able to make a contradiction true. Theists 
who incline to (6) do not mean to say this)7 They mean rather that God is 
fully able to annihilate our universe, that once He has done so, He will be 
fully able to replace it with a --, L universe, and that whether He has the latter 
full ability is entirely up to Him. They mean, in short, that 
7. in our possible world, God is fully able to be fully able to create a uni-
verse with other physical laws than ours. 
Iterations of "fully able" (and of "able") do not collapse into single uses; 
"fully able to be fully able" does not entail "fully able." Whoever cannot play 
the piano is not fully able to playa piano concerto. But if one who cannot 
play the piano is fully able to learn to play the piano, that person is fully able 
to be fully able to play the piano, and once fully able to play the piano is fully 
able to learn to play the concerto, and thereafter to be fully able to play the 
concerto. 
Thus theism does not provide a counter-example to HEP. But even if it 
did, theists could rightly assert a related claim, 
The Metaphysical Having-Exercising Principle (MHEP). If it is 
in some way possible to have some ability, then it is metaphysi-
cally possible to exercise that ability. 
We grant that God can create worlds with different physical laws only 
because we grant that there are metaphysically possible worlds with other 
physical laws- because genuine worlds lie beyond the bounds of physical 
possibility. We do not in the same way grant that genuine worlds lie beyond 
the bounds of metaphysical possibility. So even if we called God's ability to 
create worlds with different physical laws a counterexample to HEP, it 
would seem legitimate to dig our heels in and insist on MHEP, i.e. deny 
Conee's claim that without HEP, we have no reason to deny that some being 
could beA~. 
Conee seems to lean toward belief in impossible worlds (463-8). So he 
might call insisting on MHEP mere prejudice. I think it is not, but a more 
salient point is that even if something could be AO, it need not follow that 
there are impossible worlds. It could be that there are only possible worlds, 
but among an AO being's repertoire of impossible feats would be both 
adding impossible worlds to the existing stock of (possible) worlds and actu-
alizing such worlds. If not even an AO being possibly actualizes a world sat-
isfying a description D, why posit the world? The phrase "to actualize a 
world satisfying D" lets us say what the not-possibly-exercised ability is, and 
commits us only to D itself. We need not say in addition that there is a 
world such that it is what the AO being does not possibly aChlalize. 
NOTES 
1. Save for relations to individuals which do not already exist when God 
makes Menzel. But these relations cannot distinguish Menzel from someone else. 
BOOK REVIEWS 279 
For if the individuals do not exist, then on Menzel's actualist (479) position, the 
relations do not yet exist either. 
2. Constituents not usually classed as parts might include form and matter, 
nature and material supposit, subject and accident. See Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae (ST) la, 3, aa. 2,3,6. 
3. So e.g. Aquinas, ST la, 3, 3; Ia 40, 1 ad 1; in VII Meta., lect. 5, #1380. 
4. Wolterstorff calls our differing present-day ontological style "relation 
ontology." This term is not helpful: constituency is itself a relation. 
5. STla 85, 5 ad 3. 
6. Again, at QD de Potentia Dei (DP) 8, 3, Aquinas writes that "Socrates and 
Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only," thus indi-
cating that he takes the identity-statement "Socrates is Socrates" as a predication. 
At ST Ia 13, 12, Thomas calls such A=A identities "predications" and expressly 
avers that they are just like other predications in having both subject and predi-
cate refer to the same entity. See also In V Meta., leet. 9, #891, and DP 2,1 ad 2. In 
effect, Thomas construes predication in accord with what is now called Wang's 
Law, taking sentences of the form "Fa" as "really" of the form "(3x)(Fx • x=a)." 
Thomas' analysis of predication refutes the canard that Thomas or medieval 
Aristotelians in general na·ively take the structure of reality to mirror the struc-
ture of discourse. The relation between Socrates and whiteness is inherence, not 
identity. Yet in Thomas' analysis of "Socrates is white," the logical relation 
involved is identity, not inherence. 
7. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (Turin: Marietti, 1926), p. 14. This 
and all translations are mine. 
8. Ibid., p. 15. 
9. Ibid., p. 17. 
10. "Human," the species term, "signifies indistinctly all that is essentially in 
Socrates" because it refers to Socrates as that which bears the particular, individ-
ual form which gives Socrates his essential properties. 
11. Ibid., p. 18. 
12. See e.g. ST Ia 3, 3. 
13. If this is correct and my reading of Aquinas' view of predication is cor-
rect, is Aquinas really a "constituent" ontolOgist? 
14. Conee includes in this abilities to have a proposition be true without 
doing anything to have them true (449). So apparently Conee believes in abilities 
one can exercise without in any way doing anything. I am not sure how to take 
this. 
15. Compare Hoffman and Rosenkrantz' distinction between violating and 
superseding a physical law (200-1). 
16. "Before" and its cognate terms can be read temporally or logically. 
17. At least, theists not antecedently convinced that something could be AO. 
Christian Philosophy, by Etienne Gilson (translated by Armand Maurer). 
Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1993. Pp. xxv and 139. 
$19.95 (paper). 
THOMAS D. D'ANDREA, University of St. Andrews 
The publication of this translation of Gilson's introduction a la philosophic chre-
tienne is a welcome event for serious students of medieval philosophy and 
theology in the more than obvious way that it makes the French work avail-
able for the first time in English. The translation should help give this slender 
